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1 Introduction
The idea of Fictitious Play (FP) is over half a century old. It was originally
introduced by Brown (1949, 1951) as an algorithm to calculate the value of
a zero-sum game. In the realm of learning in games (Fudenberg and Levine,
1998), Fictitious Play serves as the prime example of myopic belief learning,
and it has its place in almost any modern textbook on game theory. The
new literature on models of bounded rationality and learning in interactive
decision contexts has revived the study of Fictitious Play and its various
smooth or stochastic o®springs. Apart from purely academic interest, this
learning process has recently also proven useful as a simple optimization
heuristic (Garcia et al., 2000, Lambert et al., 2002).2 Ulrich Berger
In a Fictitious Play process two players are engaged in the repeated
play of a bimatrix game. Each player believes that her opponent plays a
stationary mixed strategy. After an arbitrary initial move, in each round, she
takes the empirical distribution of pure strategies played by the opponent as
her belief and responds with a pure strategy that maximizes her expected
payo® given this belief, i.e., with a myopic best response. We say that an FP
process approaches equilibrium, if the sequence of beliefs converges to the
set of Nash equilibria of the game. A game is said to have the Fictitious Play
property (FPP), if every FP process approaches equilibrium in this game.
It is well known that not every game has the FPP. Shapley (1964) demon-
strated this with an example of a 3£3 game, where the beliefs converge to
a limit cycle. More recent studies of nonconvergent FP processes include
Cowan (1992), Jordan (1993), Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995), Krishna
and SjÄ ostrÄ om (1998), and Foster and Young (1998). However, most of the re-
search concerned with Fictitious Play tried to identify classes of games with
the FPP. Often cited convergence results1 are those for zero-sum games
(Robinson, 1951), 2£2 games (Miyazawa, 1961), supermodular games with
a unique equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts, 1991), supermodular games
with diminishing returns (Krishna, 1992), and weighted potential games
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996a).2
The results of Miyazawa and Krishna are subject to a technical con-
straint: both use a particular tie-breaking rule. With Brown's original def-
inition of FP, without the assumption of a tie-breaking rule, their results
need not hold, at least for degenerate games. This has been demonstrated by
Monderer and Sela (1996) with an example of a 2£2 supermodular game with
diminishing returns, for which FP need not converge.3 In their example, it is
a degeneracy of the game which permits nonconvergent FP processes. Sub-
sequently, Monderer and Shapley (1996a) showed, that without assuming a
tie-breaking rule, one must restrict the analysis to nondegenerate games in
order to save Miyazawa's result.4 Speci¯cally, they proved that every 2£2
game satisfying a particular nondegeneracy assumption has the FPP. This
result was later extended to 2£3 games by Sela (2000), and ¯nally to 2£n
games by Berger (2003a).
Referring to supermodular games with diminishing returns, however,
Monderer and Sela (1996, p. 145) state that they \do not know whether such
1 See Krishna and SjÄ ostrÄ om (1997) for a short survey. Beyond these well known
results, convergence has also been shown for symmetric games with an interior
ESS (Hofbauer, 1995), certain `one-against-all' games (Sela, 1999), and special
classes of `cyclic' games (Berger, 2001, 2002).
2 There are also similar results for other, closely related variants of FP, e.g.
Fudenberg and Kreps' (1993) stochastic Fictitious Play, see Benaim and Hirsch
(1999) and Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), or the smooth best response dynamics,
see Hopkins (1999). Our work is not concerned with these variants.
3 For a helpful visualization of this example see Cressman (2003, p. 84).
4 See also Metrick and Polak (1996) for an analysis of FP in 2£2 games.Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property 3
a generic result holds for Krishna's games as well". Hence the question if,
without using a tie-breaking rule, a nondegeneracy condition similar to the
one of Monderer and Shapley (1996a) can save Krishna's result, remained
open.
It has also been conjectured that the assumption of diminishing returns
is not really necessary for supermodular games to have the FPP. A small
step in this direction was done by Hahn (1999), who, using Krishna's tie-
breaking rule, proved that 3£3 supermodular games have the FPP.
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) showed that many of the known results
for supermodular games can already be derived under the weaker condition
of quasi-supermodularity. Among these results is the one of Milgrom and
Roberts (1991). Hence FP also converges in quasi-supermodular games with
a unique equilibrium. In his paper, Krishna (1992) also raised the question,
if quasi-supermodularity could already su±ce for his result. However, as he
demonstrates, his proof does not extend to this larger class of games. He
gives no counterexample either, and leaves this question unanswered.
Monderer and Shapley (1996a, 1996b) de¯ne the class of ordinal poten-
tial games, which contains the class of weighted potential games.5 For the
latter, they prove convergence of FP to the equilibrium set. The relation
between ordinal potential games and weighted potential games is somehow
analogous to the relation between quasi-supermodular games and super-
modular games, since the former are ordinal concepts while the latter are
cardinal concepts. In the light of Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) results,
the conjecture that the FPP carries over from weighted potential games to
(nondegenerate) ordinal potential games suggests itself. However, it has also
been explicitly doubted, e.g. by Monderer and Sela (1997).
The present paper extends the described results of Krishna (1992), Hahn
(1999), and Monderer and Shapley (1996a). For supermodular games with
diminishing returns, we ¯rst clarify the question of Monderer and Sela
(1996) insofar, as we prove that without assuming a tie-breaking rule, Kr-
ishna's result indeed continues to hold for nondegenerate games. Second, and
more importantly, we show that even all nondegenerate quasi-supermodular
games with diminishing returns have the FPP. Concerning potential games,
we prove that also nondegenerate games with an ordinal potential have the
FPP. As a by-product, we ¯nally obtain convergence of FP in nondegenerate
3£m and 4£4 quasi-supermodular games.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
introduce the notation and terminology we use, and de¯ne (quasi-) su-
permodular games, diminishing returns, nondegeneracy, ordinal potential
games, Fictitious Play, and games with the pure Nash equilibrium property.
Section 3 contains two important properties of Fictitious Play. In Section
4 we derive the ¯rst main result on ordinal potential games. Section 5 is
5 Weighted potential games include Rosenthal's (1973) congestion games and
have previously been called rescaled partnership games by Hofbauer and Sigmund
(1988).4 Ulrich Berger
concerned with quasi-supermodular games with diminishing returns, and
contains the second main result. In Section 6 we prove convergence for 3£m
and 4£4 quasi-supermodular games, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Notation and De¯nitions
2.1 Bimatrix Games and Best Responses
Let (A;B) be a bimatrix game where player 1, the row player, has pure
strategies i 2 N = f1;2;:::;ng, and player 2, the column player, has pure
strategies j 2 M = f1;2;:::;mg. A and B are the n£m payo® matrices
for players 1 and 2. Thus, if player 1 chooses i 2 N and player 2 chooses
j 2 M, the payo®s to players 1 and 2 are aij and bij, respectively. The set
of mixed strategies of player 1 is the n ¡ 1 dimensional probability simplex
Sn, and analogously Sm is the set of mixed strategies of player 2. With a
little abuse of notation we will not distinguish between a pure strategy i
of player 1 and the corresponding mixed strategy representation as the i-th
unit vector ei 2 Sn. Analogously we identify player 2's pure strategy j with
the j-th unit vector fj 2 Sm. Sometimes we will also speak of the players
choosing a row, or column, respectively, of the bimatrix.
The expected payo® for player 1 playing strategy i against player 2's
mixed strategy y = (y1;:::;ym)t 2 Sm (where the superscript t denotes
the transpose of a vector or matrix) is (Ay)i. Analogously (Btx)j is the
expected payo® for player 2 playing strategy j against the mixed strategy
x = (x1;:::;xn)t 2 Sn. If both players use mixed strategies x and y,
respectively, the expected payo®s are x¢Ay to player 1 and y¢Btx to player
2, where the dot denotes the scalar product of two vectors. We denote by
BR2(x) player 2's pure strategy best response correspondence, and by br2(x)
her mixed strategy best response correspondence. Analogously, BR1(y) and
br1(y) are the sets of player 1's pure and mixed best responses, respectively,
to y 2 Sm. Let BR(x;y) = BR1(y)£BR2(x) and br(x;y) = br1(y)£br2(x).
We say that (^ x; ^ y) is a best response to (x;y) 2 Sn£Sm, if (^ x; ^ y) 2 br(x;y).
Also, we call (^ x; ^ y) a pure best response to (x;y), if (^ x; ^ y) 2 BR(x;y).
A strategy pro¯le (x¤;y¤) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if (x¤;y¤) 2
br(x¤;y¤). It is called a pure Nash equilibrium, if (x¤;y¤) 2 BR(x¤;y¤).
2.2 Quasi-Supermodular Games and Supermodular Games
De¯nition 1 (i) A bimatrix game (A;B) is quasi-supermodular, if for all
i < i0 and j < j0:
ai0j > aij =) ai0j0 > aij0 and bij0 > bij =) bi0j0 > bi0j:
(ii) A bimatrix game (A;B) is supermodular, if for all i < i0 and j < j0:
ai0j0 ¡ aij0 > ai0j ¡ aij and bi0j0 ¡ bi0j > bij0 ¡ bij:Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property 5
We write QSMG short for quasi-supermodular game, and SMG for su-
permodular game. In a QSMG, the payo® di®erence between two payo®s in
a column of A or a line of B can change its sign at most once, and only from
¡1 to +1, if the players move up to a higher column or line, respectively. In
a broader context, these games have been studied by Milgrom and Shannon
(1994). From De¯nition 1, quasi-supermodularity is implied by supermodu-
larity. In an SMG, the advantage of switching to a higher strategy increases
when the opponent chooses a higher strategy.
Both QSMGs and SMGs have frequently been called games with strate-
gic complementarities. We refrain from using this term to avoid confusion.
Originally, the term \strategic complementarities" was coined by Bulow et
al. (1985) to denote games with increasing best response correspondences.
This property is already implied by quasi-supermodularity. SMGs have been
introduced (in a much more general framework) by Topkis (1979) and stud-
ied by Vives (1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990). This class of games has
important applications in economics, e.g. in models of oligopolistic compe-
tition, R&D competition, macroeconomic coordination, bank runs, network
externalities, and many others.
2.3 Games with Diminishing Returns
Another condition we use is diminishing returns, sometimes also referred to
as diminishing marginal returns. As the name suggests, this property means
that the payo® advantage of increasing one's strategy is decreasing.
De¯nition 2 A bimatrix game (A;B) has diminishing returns (DR), if for
all i = 2;:::;n ¡ 1 and j 2 M,
ai+1;j ¡ aij < aij ¡ ai¡1;j;
and for all i 2 N and j = 2;:::;m ¡ 1,
bi;j+1 ¡ bij < bij ¡ bi;j¡1:
Krishna (1992) observed that DR restrict the best response correspon-
dence in the following way.
Lemma 1 Let (A;B) be a game with DR. Then for any (x;y) 2 Sn£Sm,
the sets BR1(y) and BR2(x) contain at most two strategies. If one of these
sets contains two strategies, they are numbered consecutively.
2.4 Nondegenerate Games
As mentioned in the introduction, without assuming a tie-breaking rule, one
must impose a nondegeneracy assumption in order to keep the FPP, even
in the class of 2£2 games. We work with games which are nondegenerate
in the following speci¯c sense.6 Ulrich Berger
De¯nition 3 We call a bimatrix game (A;B) degenerate, if for some i;i0 2
N, with i 6= i0, there exists j 2 M with ai0j = aij, or if for some j;j0 2 M,
with j 6= j0, there exists i 2 N with bij0 = bij. Otherwise, the game is said
to be nondegenerate.
We write ND((Q)SM)G short for nondegenerate ((quasi-)supermodular)
game.
2.5 Ordinal Potential Games
Monderer and Shapley (1996b) de¯ne several classes of games with a so-
called potential. The class of ordinal potential games contains the class of
weighted potential games, for which Monderer and Shapley (1996a) proved
the FPP.
De¯nition 4 We say that a bimatrix game (A;B) is an ordinal potential
game (OPG), if there exists an ordinal potential function, i.e. a function
F : N£M ! R, such that for all i;i0 2 N and j;j0 2 M,
ai0j > aij , F(i0;j) > F(i;j);
and
bij0 > bij , F(i;j0) > F(i;j):
They also de¯ne improvement paths and games with the ¯nite improve-
ment property. We extend this de¯nition slightly by de¯ning improvement
steps.
De¯nition 5 For a bimatrix game (A;B), de¯ne the following binary rela-
tion on N£M:
(i;j) ! (i0;j0) , (i = i0 and bij0 > bij) or (j = j0 and ai0j > aij).
(i) If (i;j) ! (i0;j0), we say that this is an improvement step. We denote
by ji0 ¡ ij + jj0 ¡ jj the length of the improvement step.
(ii) An improvement path is a (¯nite or in¯nite) sequence of improvement
steps (i1;j1) ! (i2;j2) ! (i3;j3) ! ¢¢¢ in N£M.
(iii) An improvement path (i1;j1) ! ¢¢¢ ! (ik;jk) is called an improvement
cycle, if (ik;jk) = (i1;j1).
(iv) A bimatrix game is said to have the ¯nite improvement property (FIP),
if every improvement path is ¯nite, i.e., if there are no improvement cycles.
It is clear that every NDG with an ordinal potential has the FIP. Mon-
derer and Shapley (1996b) show that also the opposite direction holds.
Lemma 2 A nondegenerate bimatrix game has the FIP if and only if it is
an ordinal potential game.
We write NDOPG short for nondegenerate ordinal potential game.Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property 7
2.6 Fictitious Play
De¯nition 6 For a bimatrix game (A;B), the sequence
(p(t))t2N := (x(t);y(t))t2N ;
called the sequence of beliefs, is a discrete-time Fictitious Play process (DFP
process), if p(1) 2 Sn£Sm, and for all t 2 N,
p(t + 1) 2
1
t + 1
[tp(t) + BR(p(t))]: (1)
The pure best response (t + 1)p(t + 1) ¡ tp(t) played at time t is denoted
by B(t). The sequence (B(t))t2N is called the sequence of actual play of this
process. The Euclidian distance jjp(t)¡p(t+1)jj between p(t) and p(t+1)
in Rn+m is called the step size of the process at time t.
The step size of any DFP converges to zero as time goes to in¯nity.
Continuous-time Fictitious Play could roughly be described as the limiting
\zero step size" version of DFP.
De¯nition 7 For a bimatrix game (A;B), the path
(p(t))t2R;t¸1 := (x(t);y(t))t2R;t¸1 ;
called the belief-path, is a continuous-time Fictitious Play process (CFP




[BR(p(t)) ¡ p(t)]: (2)
The pure best response p(t)+t_ p(t) played at time t is denoted by B(t). The
path t 7! B(t) for t ¸ 1 is called the path of actual play of this process.
If actual play converges, it must be constant from some stage on, im-
plying that the process converges to the respective pure Nash equilibrium.
Even if actual play does not converge, it is easily established that if the FP
process does, then the limit must be a Nash equilibrium. As noted above,
however, there are games where FP need not converge.
In general an FP process is not de¯ned uniquely by its initial value
p(1). Indeed, if at some point in time the best response set is multivalued,
there may be several possible continuations of a process. To handle this
multiplicity of solutions, particular tie-breaking rules have sometimes been
assumed. Krishna (1992) e.g. assumed that both players, whenever indif-
ferent between two or more pure strategies, choose the strategy with the
highest number. However, any tie-breaking rule is somehow arti¯cial, and
should therefore be avoided, as long as there is no (external) reason why
some pure best responses should not be chosen in a Fictitious Play.
Both CFP and DFP have been introduced by Brown (1949). Which
version to prefer is mainly a matter of taste. In recent studies of the FP8 Ulrich Berger
process, CFP is often preferred to DFP, because it is usually much easier to
work with. For example, Robinson's (1951) proof for DFP is several pages
long, while the proof of the same result6 for CFP, based on a Ljapunov
function, requires only a few lines. In this paper we therefore stick to the
continuous-time version of FP as well.7
CFP is closely related to the best response dynamics,
p(1) 2 Sn£Sm; _ p(t) 2 br(p(t)) ¡ p(t) for almost all t ¸ 1; (3)
a learning process for population games, introduced by Gilboa and Matsui
(1991) and Matsui (1992). These continuous-time processes have also been
studied by RosenmÄ uller (1971), Monderer et al. (1997), and Harris (1998),
they are surveyed by Krishna and SjÄ ostrÄ om (1997) and Hofbauer and Sig-
mund (2003). Hofbauer (1995) proved that solutions, possibly multiple ones,
exist, and are essentially piecewise linear. In all known cases, the behavior
of DFP is very similar to that of CFP. Only a few formal results on the re-
lation between these two versions are available, however, see e.g. Hofbauer
and Sorin (2002).
In the de¯nition of CFP, (2) is a di®erential inclusion (see Aubin and
Cellina, 1984). The de¯nition of CFP does not guarantee existence of solu-
tions from all initial values, because the pure best response correspondence
BR(p) admits nonconvex values in general. For instance, starting with initial
beliefs arbitrarily close to the completely mixed equilibrium in a Matching
Pennies game, we get unique solutions of CFP (which can be shown to
spiral inwards to the equilibrium), but starting directly in the equilibrium,
the CFP path cannot be continued with players using only pure strategies.
To get existence of solutions for all initial values, we would have to allow
for mixed best responses in the de¯nition of CFP, as this is done for the
best response dynamics. As Hofbauer (1995) argues, this is meaningful, and
even essential, for the latter. However, it would be against the spirit of CFP
as a learning process, since players cannot observe their opponent's mixed
strategies.
The analysis of Hofbauer (1995) shows that piecewise linear solutions of
CFP exist through any initial value, and can be continued for all positive
times, in every game with the pure Nash equilibrium property. To explain
this property, let N0 ½ N and M0 ½ M be nonempty subsets of the players'
pure strategy sets. We call the restriction of the original game to these
pure strategy subsets a bimatrix-subgame.8 The following de¯nition is from
Takahashi and Yamamori (2002).
6 See Cowan (1992), or Hofbauer (1995). A sketch of this proof already appears
in Brown (1949).
7 A partial result for DFP is worked out in Berger (2003b).
8 Takahashi and Yamamori (2002) simply call it a subgame. To avoid confusion
with the notion of a subgame in the context of extensive form games, we refrain
from using this term.Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property 9
De¯nition 8 A game has the pure Nash equilibrium property (PNEP), if
every bimatrix-subgame has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Existence of piecewise linear solutions through all initial values in games
with the PNEP follows, because for every p(1) 2 Sn£Sm, actual play of
the process can be continued with a pure Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix-
subgame with N0£M0 = BR(p(t)).
Ordinal potential games, quasi-supermodular games, and dominance-
solvable games have pure Nash equilibria. Since for games in these classes,
any bimatrix-subgame is again a game of the same class, these games have
the PNEP. Hence, for such games, CFP paths exist through any initial
value. These paths follow straight lines in the simplex product as long as
actual play is constant. Whenever one of the players switches to another
pure best response, the path changes its direction discontinuously. This can
only happen when beliefs cross the so-called indi®erence hyperplanes, the
sets of mixed strategy pro¯les where one of the players is indi®erent between
several best responses. A formal de¯nition of switching follows.
De¯nition 9 We say that a CFP process p(t) switches from (i;j) to (i0;j0)
at time t1, if (i0;j0) 6= (i;j) and there exists ² > 0 with B(t) = (i;j) for
t 2 [t1 ¡ ²;t1[ and B(t) = (i0;j0) for t 2]t1;t1 + ²].
3 Two Improvement Principles for Fictitious Play
Whenever switching occurs along an FP process, at least one of the players
changes her strategy. The next lemma shows that the `new' strategy of this
player must be a weakly better response than her `old' strategy against the
`old' strategy of the opponent. This was called the Improvement Principle
by Monderer and Sela (1997), see also Sela (2000). To keep the analysis
self-contained, we repeat the proof here.
Lemma 3 If an FP process for the bimatrix game (A;B) switches from
(i;j) to (i0;j0), then
ai0j ¸ aij and bij0 ¸ bij:
Proof Let t1 be the time where the process switches from (i;j) to (i0;j0).
Then both players are indi®erent between their respective best responses,
f(i;j);(i0;j0)g ½ BR(p(t1)). By De¯nition 9 there exists ² > 0 with B(t) =
(i;j) for t 2 [t0;t1[, where t0 = t1 ¡ ². Hence p(t1) is a convex combination
of p(t0) and (i;j), and we can write (ei;fj) = cp(t1)+(1¡c)p(t0) for some
c ¸ 1. Left-multiplying the second component vector with the payo® matrix
A yields Afj = cAy(t1) + (1 ¡ c)Ay(t0). Subtracting the i-th line of this
vector equation from the i0-th line gives
ai0j ¡ aij =
= c[(Ay(t1))i0 ¡ (Ay(t1))i] + (1 ¡ c)[(Ay(t0))i0 ¡ (Ay(t0))i]:10 Ulrich Berger
The ¯rst term on the right-hand side of this equation is zero, and the second
term is nonnegative, since i 2 BR1(y(t0)) and c ¸ 1. Hence ai0j ¸ aij. By
the same reasoning we get bij0 ¸ bij. u t
The following complement of Lemma 3 is an essential requirement of our
proofs. We call it the Second Improvement Priciple.
Lemma 4 If a CFP process for the bimatrix game (A;B) switches from
(i;j) to (i0;j0), then
ai0j0 ¸ aij0 and bi0j0 ¸ bi0j:
Proof Again let t1 be the time where the process switches from (i;j) to
(i0;j0), then f(i;j);(i0;j0)g ½ BR(p(t1)). By De¯nition 9 there exists ² > 0
with B(t) = (i0;j0) for t 2]t1;t2], where t2 = t1 +². Hence p(t2) is a convex
combination of p(t1) and (i0;j0), and we can write (ei0;fj0) = cp(t2) + (1 ¡
c)p(t1) for some c ¸ 1. Left-multiplying the second component vector with
the payo® matrix A yields Afj0 = cAy(t2)+(1¡c)Ay(t1). Subtracting the
i-th line of this vector equation from the i0-th line gives
ai0j0 ¡ aij0 =
= c[(Ay(t2))i0 ¡ (Ay(t2))i] + (1 ¡ c)[(Ay(t1))i0 ¡ (Ay(t1))i]:
The second term on the right-hand side of this equation is zero, and the
¯rst term is nonnegative, since i0 2 BR1(y(t2)). Hence ai0j0 ¸ aij0. By the
same reasoning we get bi0j0 ¸ bi0j. u t
If only one of the players switches her strategy at time t1, i.e. if i = i0
or j = j0, then in both of these two Lemmas, one of the inequalities is
trivially true, while the other inequalities are then identical, and simply state
that (i;j) ! (i0;j0). Only if both players switch simultaneously, Lemma 4
comes into use. If, moreover, the game is nondegenerate, then the strict
inequalities hold. In this case we know that (i;j) ! (i0;j) ! (i0;j0), and
also (i;j) ! (i;j0) ! (i0;j0).
4 Fictitious Play in Ordinal Potential Games
By the last remark, if an FP process switches from (i;j) to (i0;j0) in a
nondegenerate game, then these two pure strategy pairs are connected by
an improvement path, even if both players switch simultaneously.
Lemma 5 If an FP process for the NDG (A;B) switches from (i;j) to
(i0;j0), then there is an improvement path from (i;j) to (i0;j0).
This is essentially all we need for the ¯rst main result.
Theorem 1 Let (A;B) be an NDOPG. Then it has the FPP.Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property 11
Proof Assume there is an NDOPG without the FPP. In a nonconvergent FP
process there are in¯nitely many switches. Since there are only ¯nitely many
pure strategy pairs, however, at least two such pairs are played in¯nitely
often. Hence there must be a sequence of switches leading from one of these
pairs to the other and back again. By Lemma 5, this means that there is
an improvement cycle. By Lemma 2 then, the game cannot have an ordinal
potential, which contradicts the assumption. u t
It should be noted, that for a nonconvergent FP process in an NDG,
actual play need not follow a single improvement cycle over and over. In
case of nonconvergence, an improvement cycle must exist, but if there is
a second such cycle intersecting the ¯rst one, actual play can in principle
jump back and forth between these two improvement cycles in an irregular
and aperiodic fashion, while the belief-path approaches a chaotic attractor.9
It is also worth mentioning that for the best response dynamics (3), there
might be piecewise linear paths pointing to a completely mixed Nash equilib-
rium of a bimatrix-subgame. For such paths, however, the two Improvement
Principles can no longer be applied to show that nonconvergence implies the
existence of an improvement cycle. Hence the proof does not carry over to
this dynamics, and we cannot rule out the existence of nonconvergent paths.
However, if they do exist, they are unstable, due to the PNEP.
5 Fictitious Play in Quasi-Supermodular Games with
Diminishing Returns
If an FP process switches from (i;j) to (i0;j0), then at the switching point
p(t1), player 1 is indi®erent between i and i0, and player 2 is indi®erent
between j and j0. From Lemma 1, an immediate consequence of this is, that
in games with DR, FP can only switch to neighboring strategies.
Lemma 6 Let (A;B) be a game with DR. If an FP process switches from
(i;j) to (i0;j0), then ji0 ¡ ij · 1 and jj0 ¡ jj · 1.
As a consequence, in an NDG with DR, actual play of an FP process
generates an improvement path where every improvement step has length
1. Lemma 5 then implies the following.
Lemma 7 Let (A;B) be an NDG with DR. If an FP process does not con-
verge, then there exists an improvement cycle consisting of improvement
steps of length 1.
However, the next result states that in NDGs, quasi-supermodularity
prevents the existence of such improvement cycles.10
9 Cowan (1992) constructed a 3£3 game in which FP shows chaotic behavior.
10 Note that we do not assert that these games have the FIP. Indeed, an
NDQSMG need not have an ordinal potential, as shown below, at the end of



























Fig. 1 The construction in the proof of Lemma 8. No sequence of length-1-
improvement steps can return to the starting point (i
¤;j
¤).
Lemma 8 In an NDQSMG, every improvement path consisting of length-
1-steps is ¯nite.
Proof Let (A;B) be an NDQSMG. Assume the game admits an improve-
ment cycle consisting of length-1-steps. Take any pair (i¤;j¤) in this cycle,
where the next step is to (i¤;j¤ + 1) | it is easy to see that such a pair
always exists. By quasi-supermodularity, we have (i0;j¤) ! (i0;j¤+1) for all
i0 ¸ i¤, see Figure 1. Since the cycle eventually returns to column j¤, there
must be a line i¡ with (i¡;j¤ + 1) ! (i¡;j¤). We know that i¡ < i¤ then.
Since the improvement cycle leads from (i¤;j¤+1) to (i¡;j¤+1), it contains
a step (i¤;j+) ! (i¤ ¡ 1;j+) with j+ > j¤. Then quasi-supermodularity
implies (i¤;j0) ! (i¤ ¡ 1;j0) for all j0 < j+, including all j0 · j¤. But this
implies that no improvement step of length 1 can enter the region of pairs
(i;j) with i ¸ i¤ and j · j¤ (coloured grey in Figure 1). Hence no se-
quence of such improvement steps can lead back from (i¤;j¤+1) to (i¤;j¤),
contradicting the initial assumption. u t
As a corollary of Lemmas 7 and 8, we obtain our second main result.11
Theorem 2 Every NDQSMG with DR has the FPP.
6 Fictitious Play in 3£m and 4£4 Quasi-Supermodular Games
It has been conjectured (e.g. Krishna and SjÄ ostrÄ om, 1997) that in (non-
degenerate) SMGs, the condition of DR is not really necessary for FP to
converge.12 Hahn (1999) has shown that this is true at least for 3£3 games,
if one uses the same tie-breaking rule as Krishna (1992). While we cannot
11 It can be shown that this result also holds for the best response dynamics.
12 In the light of Hofbauer and Sandholm's (2002) recent results it may be nec-
essary, however, to weaken this conjecture to only almost all initial conditions.Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property 13
prove the conjecture, we can extend Hahn's result to 3£m and 4£4 NDQS-
MGs. Basically, these games have the FPP because they have the FIP, and
hence an ordinal potential.
Theorem 3 Every 3£m and 4£4 NDQSMG has the FPP.
We prove only the 3£m case. The proof of the 4£4 case is analogous. Like
the proof below, it basically consists in going through all possible order rela-
tions between payo®s consistent with quasi-supermodularity, and checking
the nonexistence of improvement cycles for each case. This is straightfor-
ward but tedious, and is therefore omitted here.
Proof Let (A;B) be a 3£m NDQSMG, and assume w.l.o.g. that there are
no dominated strategies. Then (1;1) and (3;m) are equilibria, and (3;1) !
(2;1) ! (1;1) and (1;m) ! (2;m) ! (3;m). Also, (1;k) ! (1;k¡1) for all
k = 2;:::;m, and (3;k) ! (3;k+1) for all k = 1;:::;m¡1. Assume there is
an improvement cycle. Now suppose there is a step from (3;j00) to (1;j00) in
the cycle. Then by quasi-supermodularity, (3;j) ! (1;j) for j = 1;:::;j00.
In the next step, the cycle must move `left' or `down' in Figure 2. Since the
cycle cannot reach the equilibrium (1;1), there must eventually be a step
down from, say, (1;j0). This step cannot be to line 3, since (3;j0) ! (1;j0).
Hence it is (1;j0) ! (2;j0), as in Case a) of Figure 2. Then by quasi-
supermodularity, (1;j00) ! (2;j00). This implies (3;j00) ! (2;j00). Hence
(3;j) ! (2;j) for j = 1;:::;j00. But this means that if we continue the
improvement path backwards from (3;j00), we move to the left and can never
leave line 3, ending up in (3;1). This is a contradiction, since (3;1) cannot
be part of an improvement cycle.
If, on the other hand, there is a step (2;j00) ! (1;j00) in the cycle, then
we also have (2;j0) ! (1;j0), and the improvement step leaving line 1 must
be (1;j0) ! (3;j0), see Case b) of Figure 2. This implies (2;j0) ! (3;j0).
Hence (1;j) ! (3;j) and (2;j) ! (3;j) for j = j0;:::;m. But then the
improvement path moves to the right from (3;j0) and can never leave line
3, ending up in the equilibrium (3;m). This is again a contradiction, since
(3;m) cannot be part of an improvement cycle. This means the game has
the FIP, and hence an ordinal potential. By Theorem 1 then, it has the
FPP. u t
This method of proof does not extend to NDQSMGs with `more' strate-
gies, however. The following is an example of a 4£5 NDQSMG with the
improvement cycle (1;4) ! (1;3) ! (2;3) ! (2;1) ! (2;5) ! (3;5) !





































3;4 3;3 2;2 2;1 0;0
2;2 2;4 3;1 3;0 1;3
1;2 0;4 0;1 0;0 2;3











In this paper, we have combined the Improvement Principle of Monderer and
Sela (1997) with what we called the Second Improvement Principle to show
that actual play of a CFP process essentially follows an improvement path.
It is then an easy consequence that in NDOPGs, since these games have the
FIP, every FP process converges. The observation that improvement steps
in an FP process in games with DR have length 1, allowed us to prove the
FPP for NDQSMGs with DR. Finally, 3£m and 4£4 NDQSMGs could
be shown to have the FIP, and hence the FPP. These three main theorems
extend the respective results of Monderer and Shapley (1996a), Krishna
(1992), and Hahn (1999).
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